Self-illness ambiguity & relational authenticity in psychiatry
Sanneke de Haan (2020) – The need for relational authenticity strategies in psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 27 (4), pp. 349-351.
Sanneke de Haan (2020) – Jezelf zijn doe je niet alleen. In: Hier ben ik, ed. Hans Dooremalen. Brave new books, pp. 245-257.
An enactive approach to psychiatry
Sanneke de Haan (2021), Two enactive approaches to psychiatry: two contrasting views on what it means to be human. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 28 (3), pp. 191-196.
Sanneke de Haan (2020), Enactive Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.
Sanneke de Haan (2020), Bio-psycho-social interaction: An enactive perspective. International Review of Psychiatry, pp.1-8
Sanneke de Haan (2020), An enactive approach to psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 27 (1), pp. 3-25.
Sanneke de Haan (2020), Enactivism as a new framework for psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 27 (1), pp. 1-2.
Sanneke de Haan (2020), Enactive causality: Interventions, cakes and clockworks. A reply to Gallagher and Donovan and Murphy. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 27 (1), pp. 31-33.
Sanneke de Haan (2017), The existential dimension in psychiatry: an enactive framework. Mental Health, Religion & Culture 6, pp. 528-535.
Sanneke de Haan (2013), De existentiële dimensie van de psychiatrie: een enactivistische benadering. Psyche & Geloof 24-2, pp. 130-140.
Online interview with Joel Krueger: Mind, body, and world in psychiatry – A digital dialogue, organized by The Philosopher
Online talk: Sanneke de Haan (2019) – An enactive approach to psychiatry. ENSO Seminar Series.
The impact of DBS on the experiences of OCD patients: Phenomenology & Identity
Snoek, A, de Haan, S.E., Schermer, M., Klosterkötter, D. (2019), On the Significance of the Identity Debate in DBS and the Need of an Inclusive Research Agenda. A Reply to Gilbert, Viana and Ineichen. Neuroethics.
Sanneke de Haan (2017), Missing oneself or becoming oneself? The difficulty of what “becoming a different person” means. AJOB Neuroscience, 8(2), pp. 110-112.
Sanneke de Haan, Rietveld, E., Stokhof, M., Denys, D. (2017), Becoming more oneself? Changes in personality following DBS treatment for psychiatric disorders: Experiences of OCD patients and general considerations. PLoS ONE 12-4, pp. 1-27.
Sanneke de Haan, Rietveld, E., Stokhof, M., Denys, D. (2015), Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the lived experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients. In-depth interviews with 18 patients. PLoS ONE 10-8, pp. 1-29.
Sanneke de Haan, Rietveld, E., Denys, D. (2014), Stimulating good practice: what an embodied cognition approach could actually mean for DBS practice. AJOB Neuroscience 5-4, pp. 46-48. Comment on: Giulio Mecacci & Pim Haselager (2014) Stimulating the Self: The Influence of Conceptual Frameworks on Reactions to Deep Brain Stimulation, AJOB Neuroscience, 5-4, pp.30-39.
Sanneke de Haan, Rietveld, Erik, Stokhof, Martin, Denys, Damiaan (2013), The phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-induced changes in OCD: An enactive affordance-based model. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7, pp. 1-14.
Phenomenological psychopathology – Schizophrenia | OCD | Embodiment
Fuchs, T., Martin, L., de Haan, S.E., Ludwig, M. (2021). Schizophrene Welten verstehen. EASE und EAWE – phänomenologische Interviews zur Erfassung schizophrener Erfahrungen. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
J. Luigjes, V. Lorenzetti, S.E. de Haan, G.J. Youssef, L.F. Fontenelle, C. Murawski, Z. Sjoerds, W. Van den Brink, D. Denys, M. Yücel (2019), Defining compulsive behaviour. Neuropsychology Review 29, pp. 4-13.
Gipps, R.G.T. & de Haan, S.E. (2018), Schizophrenic Autism. In: G. Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. Fernandez, P. Fusar-Poli, A. Raballo, R. Rosfort (eds). Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 812-826.
Sanneke de Haan, Rietveld, E., Denys, D. (2015), Being free by losing control: What obsessive-compulsive disorder can tell us about free will. In: W. Glannon (ed.), Free will and the brain: Neuroscientific, philosophical, and legal perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 83-103.
Sanneke de Haan (2013), Te veel denken is gevaarlijk. Fenomenologie van hyperreflexiviteit en lichaamservaring in de psychiatrie. In: M. Schermer & M. Boenink & G. Meynen (red.), Komt een filosoof bij de dokter. Amsterdam: Boom, pp. 35-48.
Sanneke de Haan, Rietveld, E., Denys, D. (2013), On the nature of obsessions and compulsions. In: D. Baldwin & B. Leonard (eds.), Modern Trends in Pharmacopsychiatry – Anxiety Disorders. Basel: Karger. pp. 1-15.
Van der Kraats, G.B., de Haan, S.E., Meynen, G. (2012), Zelfbeleving in de vroege fase van psychose: een fenomenologisch benadering. Tijdschrift voor Psychiatrie 54-12, pp. 1021-1029.
Sanneke de Haan (2011), Fenomenologie van de lichaamservaring. In: D. Denys & G. Meynen (red.), Handboek Psychiatrie en Filosofie. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom, pp. 213-229.
Sanneke de Haan, S.E. & Fuchs, T. (2010), The ghost in the machine: disembodiment in schizophrenia. Psychopathology 43, pp. 327-333.
Laroi, F. & de Haan, S.E. & Jones, S. & Raballo, A. (2010), Auditory verbal hallucinations: dialoguing between the cognitive sciences and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, pp. 225-240.
Affordances | Enactivism | Minimal self | Other
Groenevelt, I, de Haan, S.E., Slatman, J., Doing bodies in YouTube videos about contested illnesses. Body & Society 28 (4), pp.28-52.
Luigjes, J, & de Haan, S.E. (2020), Psychiatrische stoornissen zijn geen hersenstoornissen. In: D. Denys, G. Meynen (eds.), Het tweede handboek psychiatrie en filosofie. Amsterdam: Boom | De Tijdstroom, pp. 163-183.
Rietveld, E., de Haan, S.E., Denys, D. (2013), Social affordances in context: What is it that we are bodily responsive to? Brain and behavioral Sciences 36, pp. 436-436.
de Bruin, L.C. & de Haan, S.E. (2012), Enactivism and social cognition: In search for the whole story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics IV (1), pp. 225-250.
Sanneke de Haan & De Jaegher, H. & Fuchs, T. & Mayer, A. (2011), Expanding perspectives. The interactive development of perspective-taking in early childhood. In: W. Tschacher & C. Bergomi (eds.), The implications of embodiment: cognition and communication. Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 129-151.
Sanneke de Haan (2010), The minimal self is a social self. Comment on Zahavi’s ‘Minimal self and narrative self: A distinction in need of refinement’. In: T. Fuchs & H. Sattel, & P. Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self. Dimensions, coherence, and disorders. Stuttgart: Schattauer Verlag, pp. 12-18.
Sanneke de Haan & de Bruin, L.C. (2009), Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, pp. 373-396.
Sanneke de Haan 